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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Timothy Lynn Friel timely appeals from the district court's order denying his 
motion to withdraw his probation violation admission. On appeal, Mr. Friel argues that 
the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his 
probation violation admission. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Friel was indicted for "statutory" rape. (40755 R., pp.10-12.)1 Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Mr. Friel pleaded guilty to rape. (40755 R., pp.16-17, 26-27.) 
Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with two years 
fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (40755 R., pp.26-28.) Upon review of Mr. Friel's period 
of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court suspended the sentence and 
placed Mr. Friel on probation. (40755 R., pp.35-38.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion for probation violation alleging 
that Mr. Friel had violated the terms of his probation. (40755 R., pp.65-66.) Mr. Friel 
admitted to violating the terms of his probation by committing the misdemeanor crime of 
trespass and consuming alcohol on multiple occasions. (40755 R., pp.66-67, 78.) The 
district court revoked and reinstated Mr. Friel's probation. (40755 R., pp.85-86.) 
1 Mr. Friel previously filed an appeal in this matter, Idaho Supreme Court docket number 
40755, and the Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the Reporter's Transcript 
and the Clerk's Record from that appeal and ordered a limited Clerk's Record and 
Reporter's Transcript be created for the instant appeal. (R., p.2.) Accordingly, all 
citations in this brief to the record from the prior appeal will begin with a reference to the 
docket number, 40755, from that appeal. 
1 
After a second period of probation, 
for a probation violation alleging that Mr. 
filed a motion for a bench warrant 
violated the terms of his probation. 
(40755 R., pp.165-167.) Mr. Friel admitted to violating the terms of his probation by 
failing to complete sex offender treatment. ( 40755 R., pp.165-167, 262.) The district 
court revoked probation, but retained jurisdiction. (40755 R., pp.275-276.) Upon review 
of Mr. Friel's second "rider," the district court relinquished jurisdiction. (40755 
R., pp.282-283.) Mr. Friel then filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, which was 
denied by the district court. (40755 R., pp.290-291; R., pp.38-40.) Mr. Friel timely 
appealed from the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction.2 (40755 R., pp.285-
287.) 
While that appeal was pending, Mr. Friel then filed a motion to withdraw his most 
recent probation violation admission.3 (R., pp.111-112.) In support of that motion, 
Mr. Friel argued that his probation violation, failing to complete sex offender treatment, 
was not willfully committed, and the district court erred when it revoked his probation 
because of a recent amendment to I.C.R. 33(e), which provides that, "The court shall 
not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the defendant or a finding by the 
court, following a hearing, that the defendant willfully violated a condition of probation." 
(R., pp.111-112, 115-122.) 
The district court denied Mr. Friel's motion to withdraw his probation violation, 
ruling that the foregoing sentence in I.C.R 33(e) only required that the admission itself, 
as opposed to the underlying conduct which provided a basis for the admission, was 
2 The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction in the 
rrior appeal. State v. Friel, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No.547 (Ct. App. June 4, 2014). 
Mr. Friel also filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, which was subsequently 
withdrawn from the district court's consideration. (R., pp.41-48, 113-114.) 
2 
willfully made by Mr. Friel at the probation violation admission hearing. (R., pp.178-
179.) In other the district court ruled that the applicable language I.C.R. 33(e) 
prevents the revocation of probation when the admission was coerced. (R., pp.178-
179.) The district court also ruled that even if it was misinterpreting l.C.R. 33(e), 
Mr. Friel willfully engaged in the conduct which provided the basis for his probation 
violation. (R., pp.179-181.) The district court then ruled that it could revoke probation 
even if the underlying conduct was not willfully committed by Mr. Friel, as long as it 
considered the alternatives to incarceration prior to revoking probation. (R., pp.181-
183.) Mr. Friel timely appealed from the district court's order denying his motion to 
withdraw his probation violation admission. (R., pp.187-190.) 
3 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Friel's Motion To Withdraw 
His Probation Violation Admission 
Motions for withdrawal of pleas are governed by I.C.R. 33(c). 4 Whether to grant 
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court and such 
discretion should be liberally applied. State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 121 (Ct. App. 
1986). After a defendant has been sentenced, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
generally will be granted only to correct a manifest injustice. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c); 
4 Due to undersigned counsel's duty of candor to this tribunal, I.R.P.C. 3.3, this Court 
must be informed that in State v. Fleshman, 144 Idaho 772 (Ct. App. 2007), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals held that I.C.R. 33(c) does not allow a trial court to withdraw a 
probationer's probation violation admissions and set aside an order revoking probation. 
Even assuming I.C.R. 33(c) empowers a district court to withdraw a probationer's 
probation violation admissions and set aside an order revoking probation, the district 
court had no jurisdiction over the order revoking probation at the time Mr. Friel moved to 
withdraw his probation violation admissions, because Mr. Friel did not file an appeal 
from the order revoking probation. The order revoking Mr. Friel's probation was filed on 
September 17, 2012 (40755 R., pp.275-277), that order became final on October 29, 
2012, which was forty-two days from the entry of the order revoking probation. I.A.R. 
14(a). Mr. Friel's motion to withdraw his probation violation was filed on December 4, 
2013 (R., pp.111-112), which was over a year after the district court lost jurisdiction over 
the order revoking probation. See State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352 (2003). 
From a cursory review of I.AR. 14(a), one might posit that Mr. Friel's first notice 
of appeal, which was timely filed from the order relinquishing jurisdiction (40755 
R., pp.285-287), enlarged the time to appeal from the prior order revoking probation. 
The applicable portion of I.A.R. 14(a) provides: 
If, at the time of judgment, the district court retains jurisdiction pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 19-2601 (4 ), the length of time to file an appeal from the 
sentence contained in the criminal judgment shall be enlarged by the 
length of time between entry of the judgment of conviction and entry of the 
order relinquishing jurisdiction or placing the defendant on probation; 
provided, however, that all other appeals challenging the judgment must 
be brought within 42 days of that judgment. 
I.A.R. 14(a). In State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the use of the word "judgment" in I.A.R. 14(a), means the original judgment not an 
order revoking probation. So only when a rider is ordered after the entry of the original 
judgment, is the to time appeal from the sentence contained in the original judgment 
enlarged during the period of retained jurisdiction. 
5 
v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887 (Ct App. 2002); State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 
358, 361 (Ct. App. 1997). It is the defendant's burden to show that a manifest injustice 
would result if the motion to withdraw the guilty plea were denied. State v. Gomez, 124 
Idaho 177, 178 (Ct. App. 1993). Manifest injustice will be found if the plea was not 
taken in compliance with constitutional due process standards, which require that a 
guilty plea be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Huffman, 137 Idaho at 
887; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
Mindful of the fact that I.C.R. 33(c) does not allow a probationer to withdraw a 
probation violation admission, and mindful of the fact that this Court does not have 
jurisdiction over this appeal, see note 1 supra, Mr. Friel still argues that the district court 
erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his probation violation admission. Mr. Friel 
argues that his probation violation admission was not made knowingly and intelligently 
because he was unaware of the implications of entering a non-willful probation 
admission. (R., pp.11-112, 115-122.) On July 1, 2012, Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) was 
amended to add an intent element, which prevents a district court from revoking 
probation without first finding that the underlying conduct, which formed the basis for the 
probation violation, was willfully committed by the probationer. The applicable language 
of I.C.R. 33(e) provides, "The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an 
admission by the defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the 
defendant willfully violated a condition of probation." I.C.R. 33(e). Based on that 
language, which was applicable at the time of Mr. Friel's September 11, 2012, probation 
violation admission hearing (40755 R., pp.165-167), he argues that he should be able to 
withdraw his probation violation admission to correct a manifest injustice because his 
6 
admitted probation violation was not willfully committed and, therefore, I.C.R. 33(e) 
the district court from revoking his probation 
The district court rejected Mr. Friel's argument because it interpreted the 
applicable language of I.C.R. 33(e) to mean that probation could not be revoked unless 
the probationer's admission was willfully made before the district court. (R., pp.178-
179.) In other words, the district court ruled that I.C.R. 33(e) was amended to prevent 
probation from being revoked when the probationer is forced or otherwise coerced into 
admitting a probation violation. The district court's interpretation of I.C.R. 33(e) is not 
consistent with the plain language of the Rule, as the word "willfully" modifies the phrase 
"violated a condition of probation." I.C.R.33(e). This phrase can only have one 
meaning, which is that the probationer must have willfully violated a condition of 
probation in order for the district court to revoke probation. The district court's 
interpretation of I.C.R. 33(e) would only be correct if the sentence was reformatted and 
the word "willfully" was removed from its current position and placed immediately before 
the phrase "admission by the defendant or finding by the court." For example, "The 
court shall not revoke probation unless there is a willful admission by the defendant or 
finding by the court, that the defendant violated a condition of probation." As such, the 
district court's interpretation of I.C.R. 33(e) is not consistent with the plain language of 
that Rule. 
The district court also held, assuming that Mr. Friel's probation violation was not 
willfully committed, that it only needed to consider the alternatives to prison before it 
revoked probation. (R., pp.181-183.) The district court correctly stated the applicable 
rule controlling non-willful probation violations which existed prior to the 2012 
amendment to I.C.R. 33(e). See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); see also 
7 
State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378 (Ct. App. 1994 ). However, the Idaho Supreme Court 
was aware of this case law and intentionally abrogated it when the Court adopted the 
2012 amendment to I.C.R. 33(e). See Druffe/1 v. State Dept. of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 
856 (2002) ("Statutes are construed under the assumption that the legislature was 
aware of all other statutes and legal precedence at the time the statute was passed."); 
see also Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., 145 Idaho 892, 900 (2008) ("We have, in the 
past, applied rules of statutory construction in the interpretation of our rules of civil 
procedure."). There would have been no need for the 2012 amendment to I.C.R. 33(e), 
if the purpose of that amendment was to allow the continued application of the holding 
from Bearden and Lafferty. Clearly, the Idaho Supreme Court was aware of Bearden 
and Lafferty when it amended I.C.R. 33(e). As such, the district court's reliance on legal 
precedents which was undermined by the 2012 amendment to I.C.R. 33(e) was 
misplaced. 
The district court also ruled that Mr. Friel voluntarily violated his probation by 
failing to complete out-patient sex-offender treatment. (R., pp.179-181.) Mr. Friel still 
contends that he did not willfully fail to complete his treatment, and that his slow 
progress in that programming was due to a traumatic brain injury, which inhibited his 
ability to progress through that programming at a faster rate. (R., pp., 115-122; 
Tr., p.10, L.12 - p.28, L.20.) 
In sum, Mr. Friel did not willfully violate the terms of his probation and the district 
court erred when it ruled that the 2012 amendment to I.C.R. 33(e), still allows Idaho 
courts to revoke probation when the underlying conduct, which served as the basis for 
the probation violation, was not willfully committed by the probationer. It follows that the 
district court also erred when it denied Mr. Friel's motion to withdraw his probation 
8 
violation admission he established that his was not entered knowingly and 
intelligently, which constitutes a manifest injustice. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Friel respectfully requests that this matter be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 6th day of November, 2014. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
9 
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